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The Nagorno-Karabagh Conflict
Revisited
By Michael G. Mensoian
Without letup, the beat goes on. The Azeri leadership’s
bellicose rhetoric toward Karabagh and Armenia has been
elevated to a new level. The occasion was National Army Day
on June 26th, which celebrates the creation of the
Azerbaijan army in 1918. Some 10,000 Azeri troops sporting
western style uniforms were in the line of march. How combat
ready and how willing these well-dressed troops are to face
death on the battlefield for love of country has yet to be
tested. Complimenting the Azeri military personnel, the
government showcased the full range of their military
hardware: tanks, artillery pieces, armored personnel
carriers, helicopter gunships, fighter planes, and whatever
else necessary to impress on the Azerbaijani citizen and
whoever else might be so inclined that their president is
not averse to settling the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict by
force if necessary.
What is of some concern, however, was the presence of the
Minsk co-chairs at this military show of force, whose
singular purpose was to intimidate the Karabagh Armenians.
Their presence unwittingly encourages the Azeri leadership
to maintain its belligerent stance with respect to Armenia
and Karabagh. Do the Minsk co-chairs, entrusted with the
task of facilitating negotiations to end the conflict, and
the member states of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that they represent, actually
believe that this is the path toward a peaceful settlement?
How can Azerbaijan’s allocation of several billion dollars
annually for the procurement of military equipment and their
goal to create a domestic military-industrial complex
contribute to the economic and political stability of the
south Caucasus that the United States and the European Union
continually espouse? How does the OSCE believe that the
Karabagh Armenians will respond to these threats against
their continued independence? It is wishful thinking if
either the OSCE or the Azeri leadership believes this
approach will yield any meaningful concessions by Karabagh
at the negotiation table. The Karabagh Armenians gained
their independence on the battlefield; it will not be lost
at the negotiation table.
What the OSCE fails to understand or refuses to accept is
that the genocide unleashed by the Ottoman Turkish
government on April 24, 1915 has continued unabated to this
day in various and subtle ways by both Azerbaijan and
Turkey. The purpose of the genocide, very simply stated, was
not just to empty the lands of the historic Armenian
provinces of its Armenian inhabitants, but to destroy
forever the Armenian nation. The irrational and perverse
policies of the Russian Bolsheviks, who at that time were
victorious in overthrowing the imperial Russian government
in 1917, abetted this genocide of the Armenian nation by
placing the Armenians of the Artsakh region under the
jurisdiction of Azerbaijan in 1923. In doing this in an
attempt to further their own political objectives, they
forced the Armenians to be “governed” by men who harbored
the same visceral hatred and desire to destroy the Armenian
nation as did their kindred leaders of Ottoman Turkey. For
seven decades, the Karabagh Armenians had to endure a
hostile political environment in which their culture was
denigrated and they were constrained from adequately
providing for their families and their future by purposeful
government inaction. For 70 years, the Azerbaijan government
allowed an economic malaise to engulf the region as a means
to force the Armenians from their historic lands.
Under these conditions, the Armenians had every right to
seek their independence. A peaceful process initiated by the
Karabagh Armenians was subverted by the intransigence of the
Azeri leadership. The Armenians had no option but to defend
their homes, their families, and their lands against a
full-scale attack by Azerbaijani military forces.
It seems counterproductive to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict if the Minsk group views Azerbaijan’s militant
posturing and unprecedented military build-up as a viable
means to coerce the Karabagh Armenians at the negotiation
table. The presence of the co-chairs was ill-advised at such
a blatant military display, whose obvious purpose was to
intimidate Armenia and Karabagh. As it is, the United States
co-chair of the Minsk group represents a government that has
consistently stressed the inviolability of Azerbaijan’s
territory. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during his
recent trip to Baku this July, signed several agreements
with Azerbaijan covering various areas of mutual interests.
Most important for Karabagh, however, was included language
that essentially supported Azerbaijan’s position with
respect to the conflict. Perhaps it is too much to expect
that these facilitator nations will allow objectivity to
prevail whenever it interferes with their respective
geostrategic interests.
Against this backdrop are the Madrid Proposals, a 2007
repackaging of the Prague Proposals put forth in 2004. They
were presented to the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan
in November 2007 as suggested preconditions to facilitate
negotiations. These proposals, individually or collectively,
are absolutely detrimental to Karabagh’s cause. This
situation was discussed in a previous article (“Is Artsakh’s
Cause Less Than Kosovo’s?”, the Armenian Weekly, May 10,
2008). At best they are pernicious proposals that serve
Azerbaijan’s cause and circumscribe the cause of the
Karabagh Armenians. If accepted as a basis for negotiations,
Karabagh could expect nothing more than a reversion to its
pre-liberation status. The Madrid Proposals represent an
insidious attack on the inalienable right of a people to
express their free will against a despotic government. The
adverse impact that these proposals will have on Karabagh
are quite obvious.
One proposal would require the Karabagh defense force to
withdraw from the liberated territory of Artsakh which forms
the security zone within which Karabagh’s primary defensive
fortifications are located.Withdrawal would bring the Line
of Contact (LoC) back to the borders of the six districts
that presently comprise the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic.
Excluded would be the Shahoumian district, whose Armenian
population had historically formed the majority, and the
eastern margins of the Martuni and Martakert districts—all
of which are under Azeri occupation. No mention is made in
this proposal to require the withdrawal of Azeri forces from
these areas. Implementation of this proposal would be
strategically fatal for the Karabagh Armenians. This would
result in the Nagorno-Karabagh Republic becoming an exclave
within Azerbaijan. Its only land connection with Armenia and
the outside world would be by way of the Lachin Corridor, an
“umbilical cord” that could be easily severed, assuming it
remained under Armenian control. A three-day conference held
in Berdzor in March this year on the settlement and
development of the Kashatagh region was an acknowledgement
of the strategic requirement to have Karabagh share a common
border with Armenia. Without Kashatagh, there cannot be a
viable Nagorno-Karabagh Republic. To withdraw from Kashatagh
would result in an untenable military situation and
seriously weaken Karabagh’s position at the negotiation
table.
Another proposal would place the security of the Karabagh
Armenians primarily in the hands of an international
peacekeeping force. During the evacuation and
demilitarization of the security zone by the Karabagh
defense force, a peacekeeping force under the aegis of the
UN, NATO, or perhaps the OSCE would take their place. From
past histories of such international peacekeeping forces, it
is to be expected that this force would be undermanned and
have neither the authorization nor the capability to prevent
a surprise attack by Azeri military forces. Recent Armenian
history suggests the dangers inherent when its security and
national interests are to be overseen by others. Shorn of
its primary defensive positions and limited maneuverability,
the Karabagh defense force would be at a decided
disadvantage to repel an attack if Azerbaijan was willing to
accept whatever the cost might be in casualties and
material. Any territory that the Azeris might seize from a
blitzkrieg-like operation would not be relinquished,
contrary to what the peacekeeping command might require. Any
call for an immediate ceasefire would also be ignored if
Azerbaijan believed it could achieve its objectives within a
matter of days. Such a situation, which could easily occur,
would be anathema to Karabagh’s cause. An additional concern
for the Karabagh Armenians would be the composition of this
international force. Would Turkey be represented? Would
other nations sympathetic to the Azeri position be included?
And, can any effective mechanism to monitor and control the
Azeri military forces be implemented by such an
international peacekeeping force?
A third proposal that would allow the resettlement of
Armenian and Azeri displaced people and refugees during the
negotiation process is also detrimental to Karabagh’s
objective to achieve de jure independence. Although the
proposal does include Armenians, their resettlement is of no
strategic importance to the resolution of the conflict. Most
of the Armenians are true refugees, having been forced to
leave Azerbaijan. The Azeris remain within their own country
purposely allowed by their government to live in squalor.
The obvious reason is to fuel resentment against the
Armenians.
Few if any of the Armenians that are properly classified as
displaced—presently living in Karabagh or Kashatagh—would
want to return to the eastern margins of the Martuni and
Martakert districts or to the Shahoumian district while they
remain under Azeri occupation and with their future in
doubt. The Baku Armenians who were forced to flee for their
lives, leaving behind whatever businesses, dwellings, and
material goods they may have had, are now dispersed amongst
Armenia, Russia, the United States, and other countries.
This represents a new, but much smaller diaspora. Few, if
any, of these Armenian refugees would have the resources or
the desire to return to Baku or any other part of
Azerbaijan. Who could vouch for their physical safety or
recompense them for their losses? This proposal for
resettlement, especially as it applies to the Azeris, is the
first step ostensibly leading to a plebiscite some years in
the future. That vote would determine the status of
Nagorno-Karabagh. The very best case scenario for the
Karabagh Armenians would be some form of limited autonomy
within Azerbaijan, physically cut off from Armenia. Is this
what the Karabagh Armenians waited 70 years to achieve? Is
this why lives, homes, and families were sacrificed?
These proffered proposals whatever their permutations might
be over time, and however they may be articulated can never
be beneficial to Karabagh’s cause.
While Azerbaijan is mounting a full court press to present
its case to the court of world opinion, the rationale for
Karabagh’s independence languishes. There can be no question
that the advantage lies with energy-rich Azerbaijan.
However, by allowing Azerbaijan to present its case
unanswered, Karabagh’s case for independence is weakened. An
immediate need exists for a proactive approach to support
Karabagh’s right to be recognized as an independent country
(“Reflections on the 90th Anniversary of the First
Republic,” the Armenian Weekly, May 24, 2008).
Therefore it is imperative that a cogent rationale be
developed and disseminated to appropriate decision-making
and decision-influencing governmental bodies, agencies,
media outlets, groups, and individuals. This informational
offensive must be expansive and constant in order to nullify
the attempt by Azerbaijan to narrow the conflict agenda to
the single, easily understood principle of territorial
inviolability. This type of effort cannot be linked directly
to Yerevan. These efforts must be undertaken by surrogate
entities within the diaspora such as the ARF and financially
supported as well by the diasporan communities. Karabagh
represents a watershed moment in modern Armenian history.
The crime against the Karabagh Armenians is defined by the
pernicious policies of the Azerbaijan government and their
effect on the Armenians during the 70 years that they were
under its jurisdiction. How can this intolerable past ever
be accepted as the future for the Karabagh Armenians?
Michael Mensoian is professor emeritus in political
geography at UMass Boston. His area of expertise is the
Middle East and Latin America.
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